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Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military, edited by Bradley Jay 
Strawser. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 (264 pages, cloth). 
 
Reviewed by Harry van der Linden 
Butler University 
 
It is a merit of this anthology that its moral explorations of remotely controlled weapons—with a 
definite focus on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or “drones”—go beyond their much 
discussed employment in targeted assassinations. Killing by Remote Control consists of a 
foreword by Jeff McMahan and three parts with a total of eleven essays. Part One covers 
background theory and sketches the main moral issues raised by the ethics of drones. In his 
introductory essay, Bradley Jay Strawser emphasizes that we must differentiate between whether 
killing by remote control is intrinsically wrong and whether the contingent employment of 
drones in our world poses insurmountable moral problems. He summarizes a wide variety of 
moral objections under both these headings, and defends his own view that UAV employment 
might be obligatory (rather than only justified) when it would prevent pilots being exposed to 
unnecessary risks (p. 17–20). The second chapter outlines just war theory, realism, and pacifism, 
and maintains that just war theory is adequate for normatively analyzing UAVs. It is followed by 
a debate between Asa Kasher and Avery Plaw discussing, among other issues, whether drone 
usage that reduces the risk to soldiers at the cost of increased (indirect) civilian casualties may be 
justified. Kasher answers in the affirmative, maintaining that current international humanitarian 
law has a “civilarian” bias (p. 59). 
Part Two concerns “the ethics of drone employment.” Three chapters address targeted 
killing and the use of drones in counterinsurgency. Of particular interest is Plaw’s “Counting the 
Dead,” which examines the data concerning the ratio of militants and civilians killed by covert 
drone strikes in Pakistan. Critics maintain that as many as fifty civilians are killed for every 
militant killed, while U.S. officials tend to reverse these numbers or even claim that recently no 
collateral deaths have occurred (p. 131). Plaw examines four databases, discusses their 
divergences, and concludes that “civilian casualties are moderate to low in relation to suspected 
militant casualties” (p. 152). More specifically, from 2004–11, the highest average ratio of 
civilians to militants killed among the databases was 23.85 percent, the lowest was 3.86 percent, 
and all databases show a significant decline in the ratio in recent years (pp. 138–39). Plaw makes 
a strong argument that these ratios show that the principle of proportionality has been satisfied. 
However, he overlooks the fact that we should take into account the costs of civilians wounded 
and traumatized by drones flying continuously overhead. Moreover, his assessment assumes 
what many have questioned: that is, whether Pakistan is indeed a war zone where the military 
standard of proportionality applies. 
The other three chapters of Part Two address UAVs and warrior virtues, the use of UAVs 
in humanitarian intervention, and UAVs as creating asymmetry. Robert Sparrow argues that 
UAV pilots as “desk jockey warriors” mostly lack the traditional martial virtues of courage, 
loyalty, honor, and mercy. He worries that with increased usage of UAVs, and with the 
introduction of autonomous UAVs, the military might move away from the culture of martial 
virtues, a culture that he views as indispensable in “reduc[ing] the horror of war and tam[ing] the 
worst excesses of young men sent out to kill strangers” when, inevitably, boots on the ground are 
needed in future conflicts (p. 105). Zack Beauchamp and Julian Savulescu argue that the 
“promise” of drones for humanitarian wars is that they reduce the problem of public aversion to 
risking the lives of troops for saving foreign lives. A weakness of this argument is that it is 
doubtful that UAVs could generally be helpful in genocidal situations (consider the Rwandan 
genocide), a point that the authors sidestep by (questionably) making Libya their case study of 
how drones could be used effectively in humanitarian wars (p. 119). Uwe Steinhoff argues that 
the most serious problem of UAVs is that they represent the latest instance of military 
asymmetry between racist and imperialist whites and all others. Steinhoff writes: “Those black, 
yellow, or brown people might therefore have a somewhat different perspective on the alleged 
advantages of warfare by drones. They might think that it is bad enough to be treated like the 
barbarian enemies but, still worse, to be treated like cockroaches on the receiving side of pest 
control” (pp. 206–07). 
Remarkably, Steinhoff is the only author who places drone warfare within a global 
political context and pays some attention to the experiences of those who are subjected to the 
deadly surveillance of UAVs. Other shortcomings of Killing by Remote Control are that it does 
not (extensively) address the threat of UAV proliferation, the opportunity costs of developing 
robotic warfare, and the military use of UAVs for domestic purposes. These types of 
shortcomings are most striking in Part Three of the anthology. George Lucas claims that the 
main new moral issue raised by autonomous weapons as compared to remote-control killing is 
their design reliability, while Stephen Kershnar argues that “autonomous weapons pose no moral 
special problem” because they do not necessarily violate anyone’s (attacker/defender/third party) 
rights (p. 229). Strawser is aware that the two articles offer a limited account, but he argues that 
their “challenge . . . to the current orthodoxy against the moral permissibility of autonomous 
weapons among ethicists” serves “my aim in this volume to move the debate forward” (p. 23). 
All in all, Strawser has indeed succeeded in his aim. 
